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INTRODUCTION
On May 10, 2013, Lois Lerner, then director of the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) Exempt Organizations unit, gave a speech
revealing that the IRS had recently decided to review some
organizations’ applications for tax exemption with heightened
scrutiny.1 Lerner admitted that certain organizations were chosen
for “centralization”—a process of assigning applications to a
specialist who is better able to handle issues raised in the
application—based on the presence of certain identifying terms in
their applications, including “Tea Party” and “Patriots.”2 The
purpose of centralization was to treat these applications
consistently, but the process brought added delay in reaching a
decision and introduced heightened scrutiny into the operations of
these organizations.3 In her speech, “Ms. Lerner defended the
practice of centralization, but admitted that referring cases for
centralization based on their names and perceived political
affiliations was wrong.”4
Many in the political world shared Lerner’s belief that the
process, as applied in the context of Tea Party applications, was
improper.5 Although the Acting Commissioner of the IRS claimed
Copyright 2014, by HEATH C. DEJEAN.
1. Lerner, in response to a request for updated information on the IRS’s
review of Tea Party organizations, admitted that “many [organizations]
indicated that they were going to be involved in advocacy work.” Transcript of
the May 10, 2013, ABA Tax Section’s Exempt Organizations Committee
Meeting, THE EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV., Aug. 2013, at 119, 126 [hereinafter ABA
Transcript]. Lerner continued by noting that the IRS’s “line people in Cincinnati
that handle the applications did what we call centralization of these cases. They
centralized work on these in one particular group.” Id. Steven Miller, the acting
IRS commissioner, admitted that the question asked of Lerner was planted,
“which gave Lerner the leeway to put the scandal into the public domain before
the release of the TIGTA Report.” Washington Alert—Part I, 59 FED. TAXES
WEEKLY ALERT, May 23, 2013, art. 19. See also TREASURY INSPECTOR
GENERAL FOR TAX ADMIN., INAPPROPRIATE CRITERIA WERE USED TO IDENTIFY
TAX-EXEMPT APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW 2 (May 14, 2013) [hereinafter TIGTA
Report].
2. See Lily Kahng, The IRS Tea Party Controversy and Administrative
Discretion, 99 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 41, 49 (2013); see also Questions and
Answers on 501(c) Organizations, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (May 15, 2013),
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/Questions-and-Answers-on-501(c)Organizations, archived at http://perma.cc/6L48-HP9X.
3. See ABA Transcript, supra note 1, at 119.
4. More Details Emerge on IRS’s Targeting of Conservative Groups
Applying for Exempt Status, 59 FED. TAXES WEEKLY ALERT, May 16, 2013, art.
2 [hereinafter More Details Emerge on IRS’s Targeting].
5. Donald Tobin explained:
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that the agency’s actions “were in no way due to any political or
partisan motivation,”6 many began to suspect that this was not
true.7 Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus voiced his
intention to subject the IRS to a full investigation, and Attorney
General Eric Holder called for a criminal investigation by the FBI.8
On May 14—a mere four days after Lerner’s speech—the Treasury
Inspector General for Tax Administration released its report on the
scandal, finding that the IRS had used “inappropriate criteria” in
selecting certain applications for centralization.9
This Comment examines the methods employed by the IRS in
selecting tax-exemption applications for centralized review.10 The
IRS’s resources are limited,11 and in the pursuit of efficiency and

Some tax-exempt groups and politicians argued that the IRS improperly
targeted conservative, politically active tax-exempt organizations for
scrutiny, while others argued that the IRS had failed to enforce
restrictions in the IRC regulating the political activity of tax-exempt
organizations. The IRS’s attempt—and some say ineptitude—in
enforcing the code’s political campaign restrictions caused a political
crisis that rocked America’s trust in the nonpartisan enforcement of the
tax laws.
Donald B. Tobin, The 2013 IRS Crisis: Where Do We Go From Here?, 142 TAX
NOTES 1120, 1120 (Mar. 10, 2014).
6. More Details Emerge on IRS’s Targeting, supra note 4 (quoting Steven
T. Miller, IRS: We Should Have Done a Better Job, USA TODAY (May 13, 2013,
9:13 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/05/13/irs-exempt-organ
izations-editorials-debates/2156991/, archived at http://perma.cc/KEZ3-WKB5).
7. Kahng, supra note 2, at 42 (“A media firestorm ensued with fevered
speculation about a hidden political agenda extending all the way to the White
House.”).
8. Id. The FBI investigation has since ended, with a finding that no laws
were broken by the IRS. Steve Benen, So Long, IRS ‘Scandal’, MSNBC (Jan.
14, 2014, 6:40 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/so-long-irsscandal, archived at http://perma.cc/667N-HR7Y.
9. See TIGTA Report, supra note 1, at 43. The TIGTA report “has been
criticized as sloppy and incomplete. It has since come to light that the IRS
targeted conservative political groups, liberal political groups, and a variety of
other groups for heightened scrutiny, although the TIGTA Report omitted these
facts.” Kahng, supra note 2, at 43.
10. Applications seeking recognition of exemption for social welfare
organizations are a narrow subset of the work the IRS does and must be
distinguished from the determinations and audit process that many readers are
familiar with through the individual tax return system, which in many ways is
quite different. See infra Part III.C.
11. The National Taxpayer Advocate, in its 2012 Annual Report to
Congress, argued:
The significant and chronic underfunding of the IRS poses one of the
most significant long-term risks to tax administration today. Because of
funding shortages, the IRS is unable to answer millions of taxpayer
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consistency, the IRS sometimes filters out applications that present a
need for greater scrutiny.12 However, the selection of specific
applications for heightened scrutiny review brings with it the risk that
the public will take issue with the selection methods used. This risk
becomes even greater when the IRS examines social welfare
organizations for impermissible levels of political campaign
intervention.13 Any suggestion that the IRS is acting with political
bias not only goes against its mission,14 but also threatens the public’s
trust.15 If it is proper for the IRS to target for centralized review
similar organizations’ tax exemption applications, it must do so in a
way that minimizes the risk that the public will view it as acting with
partisan motives.16 These risks can be reduced if the IRS adopts an
open-door determinations process, allowing organizations to selfcertify that they qualify for exemption, and moves its centralization
practices exclusively to the audit process.17

telephone calls or timely process letters; the tax gap (i.e., the amount of
tax due but uncollected) stands at nearly $400 billion each year.
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 5 (2012), available at http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/user
files/file/2012-Annual-Report-to-Congress-Executive-Summary.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/ZCB2-DA5P.
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part I.A.2. “Political campaign intervention” refers to the subcategory of political spending that must not become an organization’s primary
activity in order to qualify for exemption as a social welfare organization. See
infra Part I.A.1.
14. As stated on the IRS website, the IRS’s mission is to “[p]rovide
America’s taxpayers top quality service by helping them understand and meet
their tax responsibilities and enforce the law with integrity and fairness to all,”
going on to state that “[t]he IRS[’s] role is to help the large majority of compliant
taxpayers with the tax law, while ensuring that the minority who are unwilling to
comply pay their fair share.” The Agency, its Mission, and Statutory Authority,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/uac/The-Agency,-its-Mission-andStatutory-Authority, archived at http://perma.cc/4578-BVGK (last updated Feb.
12, 2014) [hereinafter The Agency].
15. Max Baucus, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, commented
that the scandal was “an outrageous abuse of power and a breach of the public’s
trust.” More Details Emerge on IRS’s Targeting, supra note 4.
16. The author recognizes that use of the term “targeting” carries certain
negative connotations and could be read to suggest that there was malicious
intent behind selecting certain applications for further review. As used in this
Comment, however, the term is meant in a neutral sense and is simply the
mirroring of terminology used by countless others when speaking of the IRS’s
procedures. For discussion of whether such targeting was, in fact, proper, see
infra Part II.B.
17. See infra Part III.C.
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Part I of this Comment begins by examining the exempt
organization determinations process—specifically in the context of
section 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations—and the reasons
why an application might be centralized for heightened scrutiny. It
then highlights the effect of the Supreme Court’s Citizens United
decision on the section 501(c)(4) application process and explores
how the decision caused an increase in political spending by social
welfare organizations. Part I concludes with an overview of past
examples of targeting by the IRS, considering the IRS’s
justifications for such targeting. Part II focuses on the Tea Party
scandal, examining the gray area between sections 501 and 527 of
the Internal Revenue Code and the structure of Tea Party
organizations to evaluate whether—regardless of the criteria
used—it was proper for the IRS to centralize the applications of
Tea Party groups. Part III analyzes the immediate response to the
Tea Party scandal and explains why the solution in place can only
be a temporary one. Finally, this Comment concludes by
advocating for an “open-door” determinations process for section
501(c)(4) organizations in which the IRS’s targeting endeavors
would lie exclusively within the audit process. It then considers
how this procedural shift could curtail an organization’s motivation
to exploit new tax issues while also fostering compliance. By
instituting these changes, the IRS could take advantage of the
benefits of centralization while also reducing the risk that such
methods might be attacked as unfair.
I. BACKGROUND: THE DETERMINATIONS PROCESS AND IRS
TARGETING
The Internal Revenue Code (Code) allows organizations that
meet certain criteria to obtain exemption from income taxes.18 To
manage these requirements, the IRS established a “determinations”
process whereby organizations can apply for recognition of their

18. I.R.C. § 501(a) (2012) (“An organization described in subsection (c) or
(d) or section 401(a) shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle.”). The
Internal Revenue Manual makes this clear in the beginning of its chapter on the
determinations process, stating:
An organization qualifies for exemption if it meets the requirements of
the Code. However, an organization is subject to tax until it establishes
that it qualifies for exemption, and most organizations find that filing
an application for recognition of exemption is the least burdensome
way to establish that they qualify.
IRM 7.25.1.1 (Nov. 1, 2003).
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exemption.19 In order to receive such recognition from the IRS, an
organization must have a purpose that fits squarely within one of the
specific qualifying categories in the Code.20 One of these specific
categories, found in section 501(c)(4), is for “organizations . . .
operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare.”21
Treasury Regulations require that a social welfare organization be
“primarily engaged in promoting in some way the common good
and general welfare of the people of the community,”22 rather than
of a private group, in order to qualify for exemption.23
Even if an organization is generally exempt from income tax, it
may still be subject to additional laws for engaging in political
activity.24 Furthermore, the extent to which an organization can
engage in political activity varies depending on the Code section
under which the organization receives exemption:
Under the current regulatory structure, section 501(c)(3)
churches and charities are entitled to receive contributions,
which are deductible by the donors. Also, in most cases the
income of section 501(c)(3) organizations is not subject to
tax. However, section 501(c)(3) organizations are
19. See IRM 7.25.1.2.1 (Nov. 1, 2003). “[Exempt Organizations (EO)]
Determinations issues determination letters on applications for recognition of
exemption and on the tax consequences of completed transactions.” Id.
20. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., TAX-EXEMPT
STATUS FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION, Pub. No. 557, 3 (Rev. Oct. 2013); see also
IRM 7.25.1.1 (Nov. 1, 2003).
21. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (2012).
22. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 1990).
23. See IRM 7.25.4.2 (Feb. 9, 1999) (“Organizations that promote social
welfare should primarily promote the common good and general welfare of the
people of the community as a whole. An organization that primarily benefits a
private group of citizens cannot qualify for exemption.”); see also TAX-EXEMPT
STATUS FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION, supra note 20, at 3. An IRS guidance
publication directed at organizations applying for recognition of exemption
begins a discussion of section 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations by
specifying:
To establish that your organization is organized primarily to promote
social welfare, you should submit evidence with your application
showing that your organization will operate primarily to further (in
some way) the common good and general welfare of the people of the
community (such as by bringing about civic betterment and social
improvements).
TAX-EXEMPT STATUS FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION, supra note 20, at 48.
24. See Ellen P. Aprill, Nonprofits and Political Activity: Lessons from
England and Canada, 142 TAX NOTES 1114, 1116 (Mar. 10, 2014). For
example, “[i]n some cases, registration and disclosure under the Lobbying
Disclosure Act of 1995 may be required,” and “some political campaign
interventions . . . come within the purview of the Federal Election Commission
and are subject to campaign finance disclosure requirements.” Id.
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completely prohibited from engaging in campaign-related
political activities. . . . [U]nlike section 501(c)(3)
organizations, social welfare organizations are not required
to file a form with the IRS seeking recognition of their
exempt status. They may seek recognition by filing a Form
1024, but they are not required to do so.25
Although “[p]romoting social welfare does not include direct
or indirect participation or intervention in political campaigns on
behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office,” a
social welfare organization exempt under section 501(c)(4) is
allowed to engage in some political activity as long as its primary
activity is related to its exempt purpose.26 Organizations described
by section 501(c)(4) can thus engage in a wider variety of activities
than can charitable, religious, and scientific organizations exempt
under section 501(c)(3), which cannot engage in any campaign
intervention.27 When the IRS reviews an application, it is tasked
with determining whether the organization primarily promotes
social welfare for the community as a whole and whether it has
engaged in an impermissible level of political activity.28
25. Tobin, supra note 5, at 1122.
26. See TAX-EXEMPT STATUS FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION, supra note 20, at
48. After stating that social welfare does not include political activity, the IRS
goes on to say that “if you submit proof that your organization is organized
primarily to promote social welfare, it can obtain exemption even if it
participates legally in some political activity on behalf of or in opposition to
candidates for public office.” Id.
27. Section 501(c)(3) grants exemption for organizations “operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary,
or educational purposes,” in addition to several other categories. See I.R.C. §
501(c)(3) (2012). Unlike section 501(c)(4), section 501(c)(3) explicitly prohibits
participation or intervention in a political campaign in support or opposition of
any particular candidate. See id.; see also IRM 7.25.4.6 (Feb. 9, 1999)
(“Organizations exempt under IRC 501(c)(4) are generally allowed greater
latitude than that allowed to organizations exempt under IRC 501(c)(3). . . .
Since the test for exemption under IRC 501(c)(4) is one of primary activities, an
organization exempt under IRC 501(c)(4) may engage in substantial non-exempt
activities.”).
28. According to explanations posted on the IRS website to address several
questions surrounding the Tea Party scandal, the IRS stated that:
The IRS’s role is to determine whether an organization meets the legal
requirements for tax-exempt status. One requirement relates to the
amount of political campaign intervention (“political activity”) that taxexempt organizations may engage in. Section 501(c)(3) organizations
are prohibited from engaging in any political activity. Other
organizations, including section 501(c)(4) organizations, may only
engage in a limited amount of political activity.
Questions and Answers on 501(c) Organizations, supra note 2. One
commentator argued that the IRS is not “particularly well suited” to regulate
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A. The Tax-Exempt Determinations Process
Applications for recognition of section 501(c) exemption are
handled by two groups within the IRS Exempt Organizations (EO)
unit: EO Determinations and EO Technical.29 EO Determinations
is the group responsible for the initial review of applications.30 The
group receives roughly 70,000 applications for exemption every
year, and these applications are initially handled by fewer than 200
employees.31 In order to handle the large volume of applications
efficiently and consistently, the agents engage in some level of
triage—termed “centralization” by the IRS—when processing
applications.32 In response to increases in “the complexity of the

political campaign activity, stating that the IRS “has no particular expertise in
campaign finance, and placing the IRS in the middle of this fray can only lead to
distrust in the agency and accusations that the IRS’s decisions are based on a
political agenda.” Tobin, supra note 5, at 1120–21. See also Kahng, supra note 2,
at 51–52 (“We would do better to avoid giving the IRS responsibilities that are apt
to be politically controversial, even if the risk of abuse is low and even if other
agencies are not necessarily better equipped to carry out these responsibilities.”).
Full consideration of whether the IRS should be completely removed from
evaluating campaign finance, however, lies outside of the scope of this Comment.
29. See IRM 7.25.1.2.1 (Nov. 1, 2003). It should be noted that the IRS is
currently in the process of reconsidering its operations in response to the Tea
Party scandal, and it is possible that this could change in the future. DANIEL
WERFEL, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CHARTING A PATH FORWARD AT THE IRS:
INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND PLAN OF ACTION 8, 53 (2013), available at http:
//www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/Initial%20Assessment%20and%20Plan%20of%20
Action.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/79X-Q3TL (“We have made a number of
changes already, more are in the works, and more will develop as we learn
additional information.”). However, the process as described in this Comment was
the method used by the IRS before the scandal. See id.
30. IRM 7.25.1.2.1 (Nov. 1, 2003) (“EO Determinations issues determination
letters on applications for recognition of exemption and on the tax consequences
of completed transactions. EO Technical issues rulings on applications for
recognition of exemption referred by EO Determinations and (in response to
requests by exempt organizations) on the tax consequences of proposed
transactions.”).
31. See Questions and Answers on 501(c) Organizations, supra note 2.
32. In an interview with the House Government Reform Committee, an IRS
tax law specialist argued that centralization was necessary to handle a sudden
influx of applications, “because there were so many at the same time” and there
were concerns raised by political campaign intervention activities that might
occur. H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 113th CONG., NO
EVIDENCE OF WHITE HOUSE INVOLVEMENT OR POLITICAL MOTIVATION IN IRS
SCREENING OF TAX-EXEMPT APPLICANTS 28 (May 6, 2014) [hereinafter NO
EVIDENCE OF WHITE HOUSE INVOLVEMENT], available at http://democrats.over
sight.house.gov/uploads/Cummings%20Report%20on%2039%20IRS%20Tran
scripts%20050614.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/KFP3-FTGB.
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applications and concerns about potential abuse . . . over the last
several years,”33 EO Determinations has designated a screening
group made up of its most experienced agents to review and
categorize all applications.34
A screening agent in EO Determinations filters out applications
that fall within an unclear area of the Code or for which there is an
absence of IRS guidance.35 These applications cannot be
completed through the ordinary screening process and are instead
reviewed by experts at another group in the EO unit—EO
Technical—who have enough experience and knowledge to handle
the determination.36 Revenue Procedure 2012-9 instructs IRS
employees to refer cases “that present issues which are not
specifically covered by statute or regulations, or by a ruling,
opinion, or court decision published in the Internal Revenue
Bulletin” to EO Technical.37 In addition to reviewing centralized
cases, EO Technical is also authorized to review determinations
letters issued by EO Determinations for uniformity and
consistency.38 In this way, EO Technical becomes the arm of the
IRS that is tasked with interpretation of tax law and its application
to specific issues in the tax-exempt context, thus providing
guidance to EO Determinations for handling future applications
that implicate similar issues.39
In addition to areas where the law and official guidance remain
unclear, EO Technical reviews tax-exempt applications in “[c]ases
where issues . . . may have significant regional or national
impact.”40 The potential impact of these “significant impact” cases
means that any mistakes or misapplication of the law by the IRS
33. EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FY 2012
ANNUAL REPORT & FY 2013 WORKPLAN 14 (2012) [hereinafter FY 2012
ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/FY2012_EO_A
nnualRpt_2013_Work_Plan.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/HK37-H8BR.
34. Upon receipt of an application, the screening group determines an
application’s status by deciding whether it should be “forwarded to the
centralized unassigned inventory for full development,” “returned to the
organization because it is not substantially complete,” “approved on merit with
no contact,” “identified as needing minor additional information or technical
clarification before approval on merit,” or “identified for secondary screening.”
IRM 7.20.2.3(3) (Aug. 24, 2012).
35. See id. (defining a category for applications “identified as needing
minor additional information or technical clarification before approval on
merit”).
36. See FY 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 14; IRM 7.25.1.2.1
(Nov. 1, 2003).
37. Rev. Proc. 12-9, 2012-2 I.R.B. 261, § 5.02.
38. Id. § 9.01.
39. FY 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 6.
40. IRM 7.20.1.4(1)(b) (Dec. 20, 2012) (emphasis added).
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could have particularly damaging consequences. Isolating these
cases to be worked by the same group not only makes certain that
they are handled by more experienced specialists, but also ensures
consistent application and provides better guidance to future
organizations seeking tax exemption.41
EO Determinations is better able to efficiently process the
voluminous number of applications it receives—many of which do
not contain interpretation issues and can be handled relatively
quickly—by transferring those involving novel interpretations of
the law to EO Technical. Applications referred to EO Technical for
full development “often take longer to process given the novel and
complex issues involved,” which is usually a period of about five
months from the time the applications are received by EO
Technical.42
The Internal Revenue Manual (Manual) directs EO
Determinations staff to “expeditiously handle any case identified
for EO Technical to avoid delay in processing the case.”43 The
Manual continues by stating that “[i]f possible, screeners and
group managers [within EO Determinations] should attempt to
identify cases that meet criteria for referral to EO Technical before
they are assigned to a determination specialist.”44 The application
review function of EO Technical is only one of many hats worn by
the group, but it makes up a significant portion of the group’s
workload.45 To a large extent, this heavy workload is due to two
factors: the IRS’s interpretation of the phrase “primary purpose”
and the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United.46

41. See NO EVIDENCE OF WHITE HOUSE INVOLVEMENT, supra note 32.
42. See FY 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 14.
43. IRM 7.20.1.4(2) (Dec. 20, 2012) (emphasis added).
44. Id. The screening group is tasked with the sizable job of actively
filtering out applications that will involve lengthy investigation based on
“criteria for referral,” which not only lessens the workload of those in EO
Determinations who must evaluate all residual applications, but also helps to
minimize the amount of time an organization must wait for its application to
make its way through both EO Determinations and EO Technical. Id.
45. FY 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 6. In addition to aiding EO
Determinations in the application process, EO Technical also issues private
letter rulings and technical advice memoranda, assists EO Examinations with the
development of forms, and reviews all IRS publications in cooperation with EO
Customer Education and Outreach. Id. Despite this myriad of duties, application
review occupied 30% of EO Technical’s workload in fiscal year 2012. Id.
46. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365
(2010).
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1. Interpretation Issues in the Determinations Process
Although the Code grants exemption to organizations
“operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare,”47 the
term “exclusively” has not been read to require that all activity of
social welfare organizations be related to the organization’s
exempt purpose.48 Instead, the IRS examines the activities of the
organization, and as long as the organization is primarily engaged
in exempt activities, its tax exemption will remain intact under
section 501(c)(4).49 Conversely, when an organization’s nonexempt political activity becomes its “primary” activity, section
501(c)(4) no longer grants exemption.50
Political activity that is not exempt from taxation—which must
not make up an organization’s primary activity—and political activity
that is properly within the exempt purposes set out in the Code are
distinct concepts. Specifically, a social welfare organization is
allowed to engage in an unlimited amount of lobbying or general
advocacy as long as that activity is in furtherance of the
organization’s tax-exempt purpose.51 “Lobbying” refers to the
attempted influence on specific legislation through contact with
legislators or the encouragement of a particular position on a
referendum; “general advocacy” includes attempts to “influence
public opinion on issues germane to the organization’s tax-exempt
purposes” as well as attempts to influence nonlegislative bodies and
encourage nonpartisan voting.52 “Political campaign intervention,” in
contrast, is described in Treasury Regulation 1.501(c)(4)-1 as
“direct or indirect participation or intervention in political
47. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (2012).
48. See B.S.W. Grp., Inc. v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 352, 357 (1978) (“Rather, the
critical inquiry is whether [the organization’s] primary purpose for engaging in
its . . . activity is an exempt purpose, or whether its primary purpose is the
nonexempt one of operating a commercial business producing net profits” for
the organization.); see also Peter Molk, Reforming Nonprofit Exemption
Requirements, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 475, 489 (2012). Molk argues
that “[t]he term ‘exclusively’ is not read in its strict sense, but instead has
received a variety of interpretations over time,” and traces this “primary purpose
test” to the early practice of allowing exemption for any charitable activity,
“regardless of how this revenue was earned.” Molk, supra.
49. See Kahng, supra note 2, at 45 (“[S]ocial welfare organizations are not
prohibited from engaging in campaign intervention . . . as long as it is not their
primary activity.”).
50. See generally id.
51. TIGTA Report, supra note 1, at 2.
52. Id. at 2 nn.8–9. See also Civic Leagues and Local Employee Associations,
U.S. Tax Rep. (RIA) ¶ 5014.13 (2013) (“Presentation of controversial opinions, or
advocating social changes (as distinguished from participating in political
campaigns) will not cause loss of exemption as a social welfare organization.”).
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campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public
office.”53 This third category—political campaign intervention—is
what must be limited for a social welfare organization to maintain
its exemption.54
The question of when an organization’s political campaign
intervention has risen to the level of “primary” activity remains
unsettled in the law.55 Although there have been several attempts
to insert some certainty into the process by placing a percentage
threshold on an organization’s political activity in relation to its
exempt activity,56 there is no bright-line test for determining
whether the political campaign activities of an organization
constitute its “primary” activity.57 Instead, the IRS has adopted a
case-by-case approach that looks at the facts and circumstances of
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1990). The IRS, in
response to the Tea Party scandal, released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on
November 29, 2013, proposing to replace this language in the Treasury
Regulations to state that “[t]he promotion of social welfare does not include
direct or indirect candidate-related political activity.” Guidance for Tax-Exempt
Social Welfare Organizations on Candidate-Related Political Activities, 78 Fed.
Reg. 71,535, 71,537 (proposed Nov. 29, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1)
[hereinafter Proposed Regulation]. Although the regulations propose to move
away from use of the term “campaign intervention” in the context of social
welfare organizations, both phrasings attempt to limit the political activity of
social welfare organizations, and therefore preference of one guideline over the
other does not alter this Comment’s analysis. Id.
54. TIGTA Report, supra note 1, at 2 n.9 (stating that “[g]eneral advocacy
basically includes all types of advocacy other than political campaign
intervention and lobbying,” thus suggesting that all political activity fits into one
of these three categories).
55. Daniel Werfel, then acting IRS Commissioner, has recognized that
“[o]ne of the significant challenges with the 501(c)(4) review process has been
the lack of a clear and concise definition of ‘political campaign intervention.’”
WERFEL, supra note 29, at 20. See also More Details Emerge on IRS’s
Targeting, supra note 4 (referring to the law of 501(c)(4) organizations,
especially in reference to political campaign intervention, as “unclear”).
56. See, e.g., Aprill, supra note 24, at 1116 (“Nowhere has the IRS ever
defined what constitutes primary activity, and some practitioners argue that 49
percent of a section 501(c)(4) organization’s activities can consist of candidaterelated campaign intervention.”); WERFEL, supra note 29, at 24 (allowing
certain organizations adversely affected by the targeting of Tea Party
organizations to expedite their applications by certifying that their campaign
activity makes up less than 40% of both their expenditures and time); Mariam
Galston, Vision Service Plan v. U.S.: Implications for Campaign Activities of
501(c)(4)s, 53 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 165, 167 n.20 (2006) (speculating that
courts could interpret the requirement to mean “larger than de minimis but not
too big,” or 10–15% of the organization’s expenditures or activities).
Regulations proposed in November 2013 in response to the Tea Party scandal
requested comments from the public regarding the amount of campaign-related
activity that should be allowed. See Proposed Regulation, supra note 53.
57. See Tobin, supra note 5, at 1122.
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each case in deciding whether a particular organization is primarily
engaged in campaign intervention.58
In the absence of a bright-line rule established by Congress,
through legislation or the IRS itself, Determinations officials and
organizations applying for exemption are left with little direction
on how a particular case should and will be interpreted.59 Without
such guidance, there is a significant risk of inconsistency as
individual reviewers likely have differing ideas of what facts and
circumstances support a finding of exemption.60 In an attempt to
minimalize this risk, the IRS directs EO Determinations to transfer
cases to EO Technical when official guidance is absent or
inconsistent.61

58. See TAX-EXEMPT STATUS FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION, supra note 20, at
23 (“Whether your organization is participating or intervening, directly or
indirectly, in any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any
candidate for public office depends upon all of the facts and circumstances of
each case.”). The IRS has attempted to define the permissible amount of
campaign intervention activity—at least in treatment of the applications at issue
in the Tea Party scandal—as less than 40% of the organization’s time and
expenditures. WERFEL, supra note 29, at 14.
59. See John F. Coverdale, Legislating in the Dark: How Congress
Regulates Tax-Exempt Organizations in Ignorance, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 809,
810–11 (2010) (“Congress ignores tax-exempt organizations for long periods of
time until a scandal draws the attention of the press to a real or purported
problem.”).
60. See NO EVIDENCE OF WHITE HOUSE INVOLVEMENT, supra note 32, at 13
(“The e-mail traffic indicated there were unclear processing directions and the
group wanted to make sure they had guidance in processing the applications so
they pulled them.”).
61. In an interview with the House Oversight and Government Reform
Committee, the screening group manager who initiated the centralization of Tea
Party applications explained the process:
[The case] would be then something we need to be aware of, and we
need to hold those cases until we have further direction. . . . So, anyone
[in the screening group] who would be looking at cases and if they had
these same particular issues presented to them, that we needed to not let
them maybe go into the general inventory as we were looking for
consistency.
Interview by H.R. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform of Screening Group
Manager, Exempt Org. Determinations Unit (Jun. 6, 2013), available at
http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/images/user_images/gt/stories/IRS_Screening_
Manager_Part_I.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Q46G-AAYS. By not putting these
cases into the “general inventory,” the Manager was making the decision not to send
the case to EO Determinations, but rather to refer it to EO Technical for full
development. Id.
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2. Social Welfare Organizations in the Wake of Citizens United
This risk of inconsistent treatment materialized in 2010, when
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United
ripped the political campaign intervention hole wide open and
brought the proper interpretation of “primary purpose” into the
spotlight.62 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, stated that
“[n]o sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the
political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”63 If
applied in the tax world, where a social welfare organization can
lose its exemption for engaging in too much political campaign
intervention, the Court’s decision appears to strike quite a blow.64
However, read narrowly, Citizens United only applies to
corporations in the campaign finance context,65 and “[n]owhere
does Citizens United acknowledge the tax limits on political
speech or address their constitutionality.”66
Regardless of whether the Court intended Citizens United to
affect the tax-exempt system, it certainly did. The Court’s limit on
government regulation of political speech meant that more
organizations could engage in political spending without
62. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
63. Id. at 365.
64. It appears unlikely that the Court would sustain a First Amendment
challenge to IRS regulation of political spending. In Regan v. Taxation With
Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983), the Supreme Court upheld limits on
lobbying by section 501(c)(3) organizations. Additionally, the use of a
compartmentalized exemption system—allowing varying levels of political
activity—would arguably not violate the First Amendment:
As long as there is a reasonable outlet for the communication in
question, the proposed regulation would not be a significant burden on
speech. Organizations can engage in unlimited political speech. If the
organization’s primary purpose is to engage in election-related activity,
it can organize as a section 527 political organization and disclose its
donors and expenditures. The proposed regulation is all about basketing
an organization into its correct regulatory home—be that as a charity,
social welfare organization, business league, or political organization.
Tobin, supra note 5, at 1129.
65. Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech of Noncharitable
Exempt Organizations After Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 363 (2011)
[hereinafter Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech] (“Citizens United . . .
rejected the notion that requiring a corporation to establish a corporate
affiliate—even an affiliate that is no more than a separate bank account—in
order to engage in political speech satisfies the First Amendment, at least for
purposes of campaign finance law.”). See also Aprill, supra note 24, at 1116
(explaining that Citizens United “struck down a provision of the federal
campaign finance laws that prohibits corporations and unions from using their
general treasury funds to make independent expenditures”).
66. Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech, supra note 65, at 364.
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repercussions.67 Unlike a section 527 political action committee
(commonly referred to as a “PAC”),68 the organizations described
in section 501(c)(4) are not required to disclose political
expenditures.69 Therefore, recognition as a social welfare
organization is an attractive option for organizations planning to
engage in this type of activity.70 As a result, the Citizens United
decision led to a rise in political spending by section 501(c)(4)
social welfare organizations,71 and the Court’s silence on the
implications of Citizens United for tax exemption of social welfare
organizations added uncertainty to the meaning of “primary
purpose” and the amount of permissible campaign intervention by
exempt organizations.72
Since 2009—the year before Citizens United was decided—
there has been a significant increase in applications for tax-exempt
status by section 501(c)(4) organizations engaged in political
campaign activity, as well as an increase in candidate-oriented
expenditures.73 This sudden upswing in applications requiring
review, and the heightened level of political activity generated by
67. In addressing the uncertainties that Citizens United seemed to provide
for section 501(c)(4) organizations, Ellen Aprill explained:
The assertion in Citizens United that “[n]o sufficient governmental
interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit
corporations” seems difficult to reconcile with the statement in the
Court’s opinion in TWR that “Congress is not required by the First
Amendment to subsidize lobbying,” a statement that permitted
limitations on one type of political speech, namely lobbying, in the
context of the case.
Id. at 393–94 (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365; Regan, 461 U.S. at
546).
68. See infra Part II.B.1.
69. TIGTA Finds IRS Used Inappropriate Criteria to Identify Tax-Exempt
Applications for Review, 59 FED. TAXES WEEKLY ALERT, May. 23, 2013, art. 3
(“Code Sec. 501(c)(4) groups have the advantage of anonymity for their donors
(unlike Code Sec. 527 political action committee (PAC) organizations).”).
70. See generally Tobin, supra note 5.
71. TIGTA Finds IRS Used Inappropriate Criteria to Identify Tax-Exempt
Applications for Review, supra note 69 (“Reports indicate that corporate
contributions to Code Sec. 501(c)(4) groups have proliferated since the Supreme
Court’s Citizens United decision.”).
72. See Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech, supra note 65, at 372–75.
73. TIGTA Report, supra note 1, at 3. In its report on the Tea Party scandal,
the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration listed figures released by
the EO unit, showing an increase year-over-year in section 501(c)(4)
applications from 1,751 (2009) to 3,357 (2012). Id. Additionally, the report
stated that tax-exempt groups overall spent $133 million on federal “candidateoriented expenditures” (meaning those “specifically . . . advocating the election
or defeat of clearly identified [f]ederal candidates”) in 2010, and that by 2012
that amount increased to $315 million. Id. at 3 n.10.
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these organizations after Citizens United, created a “perfect storm”
for EO Determinations: an increased workload with a higher risk
of excessive campaign intervention in an area of the tax law that is
notoriously unclear.74
3. Benefits of Centralization
The centralization of applications by the IRS improves overall
efficiency within the determinations process.75 One employee
reviewing 20 applications is likely to work through those
applications much more quickly when the applications share
similar facts than if each application represents a different set of
facts and circumstances from the others. EO Technical handles the
applications with similar facts that require interpretation of the law
and take longer to review, whereas EO Determinations is tasked
with review of applications that entail a large variety of facts and
circumstances, but that can be reviewed relatively quickly because
they do not require interpretation of unsettled areas of law.76
In addition to added efficiency, centralization improves
consistency and certainty in the determinations process.77 Aside
from the obvious benefit of ensuring that similar cases are worked
in the same way, centralization brings a degree of certainty to
organizations seeking guidance on how the IRS is likely to respond
to their applications.78 An organization applying for recognition of
exemption will have a much better idea of how much campaign
activity it can engage in if it can get a sense of the IRS’s precedent
in the area;79 however, that precedent only materializes when IRS
decisions are consistent, and centralization is the means to achieve
that consistency.
Centralization of related applications is also a useful way for
the IRS to handle new tax problems as they arise.80 Although full
development of cases involving these new problems—triggered
through centralization—leads to a slower determinations process
for those early cases, the consistency and efficiency brought by
74. Perhaps it would be better to place this “perfect storm” above a raging
whirlpool within the Bermuda Triangle.
75. More Details Emerge on IRS’s Targeting, supra note 4.
76. See IRM 7.20.1.4 (Dec. 20, 2012).
77. See Interview with Screening Group Manager, supra note 61, at 63.
78. A screening group manager explained that “with this additional concern
for high profile [cases] . . . we may want to really look at things for precedent
setting, we may want to look at things for consistency setting.” Id. at 49.
79. See id.
80. Lois Lerner stated that centralization “helps with the learning curve, it
helps with consistency.” ABA Transcript, supra note 1, at 126.

2014]

COMMENT

275

centralization help to minimize the period during which those
applications have to be fully developed. Once the IRS reaches a
decision on how a certain type of application should be processed
and that precedent is communicated to EO Determinations,
subsequent similar applications will experience less delay. While
EO Technical examines these cases, EO Determinations is better
able to review all of the applications that do not require novel
interpretations of the law. By taking these applications out of the
hands of EO Determinations, the IRS ensures that applications that
can be processed quickly are not being unnecessarily delayed
because of difficulties related to another organization.81 Once EO
Technical has worked enough related cases, EO Determinations
then has the guidance it needs to process these new cases itself,
leaving EO Technical free to tackle the next major tax problem.
B. Examples of Acceptable Exempt Organization Targeting
Although the recent popularity of the Tea Party82 brought IRS
targeting into the public spotlight, the scandal is not the first
controversy surrounding IRS centralization methods,83 nor is it the
first time that the IRS has targeted similar organizations for
efficient and consistent treatment of fresh legal problems.84 The
Tea Party targeting was just another iteration of a process that the
81. By sending applications requiring difficult determinations to a separate
group for processing, EO Determinations is left with applications that can be
processed quickly, with the implication that such a queue of “easier”
applications would not be held up by those requiring more intensive
determinations.
82. The Tea Party website states that the movement “has grown far beyond
belief, from a handful of brave Patriots to tens of millions” since its formation
on September 2, 2004. About Us – Tea Party, TEAPARTY, http://www.teaparty
.org/about-us/, archived at http://perma.cc/W7NX-YR93 (last visited June 30,
2014).
83. The IRS began to target individuals in 2011 and 2012 in response to
concerns that individuals were donating to section 501(c)(4) social welfare
organizations without reporting them as taxable gifts. More Details Emerge on
IRS’s Targeting, supra note 4. Though the acting commissioner denied any
political motivation, the fact that IRS enforcement in this area had previously
been virtually nonexistent led to concerns. Id.
84. In Lerner’s remarks to the ABA on the Tea Party centralization, she
explained:
[Centralization is] something that we do when we see an uptick in a
new kind of application or something that we just haven’t seen before.
You folks might remember back a couple of years ago we had credit
counseling; we centralized those cases. We had mortgage foreclosure;
we centralized those cases.
ABA Transcript, supra note 1, at 126.

276

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

IRS has used several times in the past, albeit on topics less interesting
to the media than a Tea Party scandal. When certain categories of
organizations posed common tax issues, their centralization allowed
the IRS to ensure that common issues were handled similarly.85
The Manual lists many types of cases that “may be categorized
as reserved inventory for designated groups in EO Determinations . .
. unless they are closed on merit.”86 These cases implicate special
legal issues, and as such, they are referred to a designated group
within EO Determinations; a similar list exists for categories of
cases to be referred to EO Technical.87 Regarding two of these types
of cases—credit counseling organizations and donor-advised
funds88—the IRS discovered particular abuses of the Code arising
from new legal issues and responded with focused targeting of
applications that demonstrated a risk of abuse.89
1. Credit Counseling Organizations
Beginning in 2002, the IRS actively examined credit
counseling organizations—designed to provide solutions to
individuals’ financial problems—“to ‘attack,’ as the [IRS] put it,
the tax-exempt credit counseling industry.”90 This targeting,
according to the IRS, arose from a “basic concern . . . that some
exempt credit counseling organizations [had] abandoned their
charitable mission in an inappropriate rush to collect exorbitant
fees.”91
85. Questions and Answers on 501(c) Organizations, supra note 2 (“[C]ases
meeting the selection criteria were centralized and assigned to designated
employees developing expertise in the area so that they could be worked in a fair
and consistent manner.”).
86. IRM 7.20.1.3(1) (Dec. 20, 2012). “Reserved inventory” simply means
that the application requires closer examination before a determination can be
reached.
87. Id. There are 40 distinct categories of cases listed in the Manual that
may be referred to a designated EO Determinations group, including the lessthan-helpful category of “[o]ther applications the Manager, EO Determinations,
decides should be reserved.” See id. Additionally, there are 21 categories of
specific EO Technical cases listed in IRM 7.20.1.4.1 (Dec. 20, 2012).
88. IRM 7.20.1.3(1) (Dec. 20, 2012).
89. Matthew T. Journy, George E. Constantine, & Jeffrey S. Tenenbaum,
The IRS Tax-Exempt Examination Process, 21 TAX’N EXEMPTS 34 (2010).
90. Id. at 34. During this period “the Service ‘examined virtually every
credit counseling organization in the country, and revoked the tax-exemption of
over 40 percent of the industry, as measured by revenues.’” Id.
91. Grace Allison, Exempt Organization Compliance at the IRS, 20 TAX’N
EXEMPTS 33, 35 (2008) (citing EXEMPT ORG., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FY
2008 EO IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES 5 (2008)).
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In Consumer Credit Counseling Service of Alabama, Inc. v.
United States,92 the Tax Court held that debt management and
creditor intercession activities—though merely adjunctive to the
educational purposes that warranted section 501(c)(3) exemption
in the first place—were “incidental to the agencies’ principal
functions” and therefore would not threaten an organization’s
exemption.93 After this decision, the number of credit counseling
organizations rose significantly.94 Many of these organizations
were initially granted exemption, but the IRS examined these
organizations anew after determining that more recent applications
were showing indicators of non-exempt activity.95 The IRS
actively sought to prevent these abuses over the next several years
through both the audit and determinations processes.96 When debt
management plans began to “overshadow” an organization’s
educational purpose—which is exempt—that exemption was in
jeopardy.97
The IRS itself made little, if any, attempt to hide its goal of
stripping many of these organizations of exemption.98
Commissioner Mark Everson stated in his testimony before the
House Ways and Means Committee’s Subcommittee on Oversight:
Over a period of years, tax-exempt credit counseling
became a big business dominated by bad actors. Our
examinations substantiated that these organizations have
92. Consumer Credit Counseling Serv. of Ala., Inc. v. United States, 78-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9660 (D.D.C. 1978).
93. Id. at 3.
94. See Ronald D. Kerridge & Robert E. Davis, Tax-Exempt Credit
Counseling Organizations and the Future of Debt-Settlement Services, 14 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 343, 350 (2010) (“In the years since [Consumer Credit
Counseling], the number of organizations providing counseling and other
services to debtors has grown substantially.” (citing David A. Lander, Essay: A
Snapshot of Two Systems That Are Trying to Help People in Financial Trouble,
7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 161, 162 (1999))); Consumer Credit Counseling,
78-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9660.
95. Former IRS Commissioner Mark Everson, in a 2003 statement, said:
“[W]e are finding credit counseling organizations that vary from the model
approved in earlier rulings and court cases. We are seeing organizations whose
principal activity is selling and administering debt management plans. . . . [I]t
does not appear that significant counseling or education is being provided.”
Kerridge & Davis, supra note 94, at 350.
96. See id. at 351 (“In addition to the revocations of exemption for many
existing organizations, the IRS became much less likely to recognize exemption
in connection with applications by newly formed entities seeking exempt status,
granting exemption to only three of the 110 applicants between 2003 and
2006.”).
97. See id. at 351–52.
98. Id.
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not been operating for the public good and don’t deserve
tax-exempt status. They have poisoned an entire sector of
the charitable community.99
The targeting of credit counseling organizations continues
today,100 and far from condemning the practice, Congress has
recognized and even impliedly approved the practice by passing a
statute placing new restrictions on credit counseling organizations.101
2. Donor-Advised Funds
A donor-advised fund (DAF) is a mechanism by which a
taxpayer making a charitable contribution can receive a tax
deduction for that donation before deciding how the donation will
be used.102 This type of charitable-giving vehicle was first used
around 1931—becoming steadily more popular since then103—and
“[i]n the early 1990s, a number of charities began operating DAFs
as their primary or sole activity.”104
Congress largely ignored donor-advised funds until articles
surfaced in the press alleging abuses in a small number of such
funds.105 In a report on problems in the world of charitable giving,
99. Id. at 350–51 (citing Press Release, IRS Takes New Steps on Credit
Counseling Groups Following Widespread Abuse (May 15, 2006)). One cannot
help but wonder how the Tea Party scandal would have progressed if the
Commissioner had followed Everson’s lead and told the House of
Representatives that Tea Party organizations “have poisoned an entire sector of
the charitable community.” Id.
100. See id. at 364–65.
101. See I.R.C. § 501(q) (2012).
102. The IRS describes the donor-advised fund as:
[A] separately identified fund or account that is maintained and operated
by a section 501(c)(3) organization, which is called a sponsoring
organization. Each account is composed of contributions made by
individual donors. Once the donor makes the contribution, the
organization has legal control over it. However, the donor, or the donor’s
representative, retains advisory privileges with respect to the distribution
of funds and the investment of assets in the account.
Donor-Advised Funds, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/Charities&-Non-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/Donor-Advised-Funds, archived at http:
//perma.cc/AR7Z-NE52 (last updated Apr. 30, 2014). See also Coverdale, supra
note 59, at 811.
103. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS AND DONOR ADVISED FUNDS 21 (2011).
104. See id.
105. Coverdale, supra note 59, at 811 (citing Victoria B. Bjorklund, Charitable
Giving to a Private Foundation: The Alternatives, the Supporting Organization, and
the Donor-Advised Fund, 27 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 107, 114 (2000); Ashlea
Ebeling, The Coming Charity Crackdown, FORBES (Aug. 15, 2005), available at
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Commissioner Mark Everson reported that “[the IRS was] aware
that some promoters encourage clients to donate funds and then
use those funds to pay personal expenses, which might include
school expenses for the donor’s children, payments for the donor’s
own ‘volunteer work’, and loans back to the donor.”106 Everson
also stressed the importance of addressing and reducing such
abuses, arguing that “[i]f these abuses are left unchecked, I believe
there is the risk that Americans not only will lose faith in and
reduce support for charitable organizations, but that the integrity of
our tax system also will be compromised.”107
The IRS still recognizes the existence of these abuses and
warns that organizations misusing their exemption can be
subjected to varying degrees of IRS action, including the possible
revocation of an organization’s exempt status.108 These responses
arise largely by way of the Pension Protection Act of 2006.109 The
Act “dealt with the concern that donor-advised funds might be
used to retain control over closely-held businesses by subjecting
donor-advised funds to the excess business holding rules
applicable to private foundations.”110 The IRS thus began to look
closely at such funds for signs that they were being used in those
improper ways, with the Pension Protection Act providing

http://www.forbes.com/window/free_forbes/2005/0815/067.html, archived at http:
//perma.cc/NUD6-LZ8C).
106. Mark W. Everson, IRS Commissioner Testimony: Charitable Giving
Problems and Best Practices, IR-2004-81 14 (Jun. 22, 2004), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-04-081.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/97QRZ4W. Everson went on to declare that over 100 organizations were in the
process of being examined for such abuses at the time of his statement. Id.
107. Id. at 2.
108. The Internal Revenue Service’s web page on donor-advised funds
explains:
The IRS is aware of a number of organizations that appeared to have
abused the basic concepts underlying donor-advised funds. These
organizations, promoted as donor-advised funds, appear to be
established for the purpose of generating questionable charitable
deductions, and providing impermissible economic benefits to donors
and their families (including tax-sheltered investment income for the
donors) and management fees for promoters.
Donor-Advised Funds, supra note 102. The website goes on to outline possible
recourse for such abuses, including disallowance of exemption for fund
payments, excise taxes on sponsoring organizations, donors, and managers, and
revocation or denial of exemption. Id.
109. The Pension Protection Act, as codified, is located throughout various
sections of Title 29 of the United States Code.
110. Coverdale, supra note 59, at 828.
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guidance on the consequences awaiting a donor-advised fund upon
a finding that it had engaged in non-exempt activity.111
The decision to target a certain group of organizations for
heightened scrutiny often arises when the IRS faces a quick
increase in applications resulting from a change or clarification in
the relevant law.112 A Tax Court case holding that debt
management functions would not threaten exemption caused an
increase in applications, which resulted in the targeting of credit
counseling organizations.113 The shift of donor-advised funds to
the primary activity of many organizations led to the targeting of
those activities for scrutiny.114 And the uncertainty in the tax law
created by the U.S. Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision
caused a rapid increase in applications for section 501(c)(4)
exemption, necessitating a similar targeting of related
organizations.115 EO Determinations staff were simply unable to
process the applications based on existing guidance and
precedent,116 and this sort of targeting is likely to arise again
whenever a new tax issue arises, not just in the context of political
spending.
II. THE TEA PARTY SCANDAL
Not long after Citizens United opened the door to greater levels
of political activity by social welfare organizations,117 Congress—
along with several organizations that had applied for exemption
but had not yet received determinations—began to question the
IRS’s motivations for centralizing particular applications.118
111. See id. at 828–35.
112. For example, “[t]he involvement of major investment houses and their
aggressive advertising led both to the rapid growth of donor-advised funds and
to increased awareness of these previously little-known entities.” Id. at 822.
113. See supra Part I.B.1.
114. See supra Part I.B.2.
115. See supra Part I.A.2.
116. IRM 7.20.2.3(3) (Aug. 24, 2012) (“Screeners review the application
package to determine, based on the facts in the case and clearly established legal
precedent (statute, tax treaty, the Code, regulations, revenue rulings, court
decisions) whether the case should be . . . forwarded to the centralized
unassigned inventory for full development.”).
117. See supra Part I.A.2.
118. In a report on the investigation into inappropriate IRS targeting, the
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration explained:
During the 2012 election cycle, some members of Congress raised
concerns to the IRS about selective enforcement and the duty to treat
similarly situated organizations consistently. In addition, several
organizations applying for I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) tax-exempt status made
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Specifically, in early 2012, a group of Senate Republicans
“questioned whether Tea Party and other conservative groups
applying for exempt status were subjected to heightened
scrutiny.”119
On May 10, 2013, Lois Lerner, the director of the IRS Exempt
Organizations unit, acknowledged that the IRS had indeed targeted
Tea Party and other conservative organizations’ applications for
centralization and full development.120 In a report released after
investigation of the IRS’s actions, the Treasury Inspector General
for Tax Administration (TIGTA) found that “[t]he Determinations
Unit developed and began using criteria to identify potential
political cases for review that inappropriately identified specific
groups applying for tax-exempt status based on their names or
policy positions instead of developing criteria based on tax-exempt
laws and Treasury Regulations.”121 Specifically, the IRS searched
for applications containing the words “Tea Party,” eventually
expanding its criteria to include applications that contained the
terms “Patriots,” “9/12,” or those that espoused certain policy
positions.122 These targeted applications were then centralized and
sent to EO Technical where they were subjected to heightened
scrutiny and a lengthier determinations process.123 Lerner
explained that “[the screening agents] did it because they were
working together, this was a streamlined way for them to refer to

allegations that the IRS . . . targeted specific groups applying for taxexempt status.
TIGTA Report, supra note 1, at 3.
119. More Details Emerge on IRS’s Targeting, supra note 4. In addition to
this allegation by a group of Senate Republicans, another group of Democrats
also called on the IRS to investigate existing exempt organizations for
impermissible levels of political campaign intervention. Id.
120. ABA Transcript, supra note 1, at 126.
121. TIGTA Report, supra note 1, at 5.
122. Id. TIGTA later elaborated on the criteria used: “‘Tea Party,’ ‘Patriots’
or ‘9/12 Project’ is referenced in the case file”; “Issues include government
spending, government debt or taxes”; “Education of the public by
advocacy/lobbying to ‘make America a better place to live’”; and “Statement in
the case file criticize [sic] how the country is being run.” Id. at 6. Another source
stated that “the criteria being used by employees include[d] ‘Tea Party,’
‘Patriots,’ ‘9/12 Project,’ ‘Government Spending,’ ‘Government Debt,’ ‘Taxes,’
‘make America a better place to live,’ and cases with statements that criticize
how the country is being run.” More Details Emerge on IRS’s Targeting, supra
note 4.
123. ABA Transcript, supra note 1, at 126 (“[I]n some cases, cases sat around
for awhile. They also sent some letters out that were far too broad.”).
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the cases. They didn’t have the appropriate level of sensitivity
about how this might appear to others. And it was just wrong.”124
To explain its targeting of Tea Party organizations, EO officials
argued that “organizations may not understand what constitutes
political campaign intervention or may provide vague descriptions
of certain activities that the EO function knows from past
experience potentially involve political campaign intervention,”
and because of this there is a higher need to isolate these
applications for full development.125 After the screening group
within EO Determinations flagged the first case in this category in
2010, the screening group manager “initiated the first effort to
gather similar cases in order to ensure their consistent treatment”
and decided to escalate the cases to EO Technical.126 The manager
denied that there was any political motivation for his actions and
instead explained:
The reason that the case was elevated to EO Technical was
based upon, you know, the high-profile issue. The agent
appropriately identified the issue as not being fully
developed, and that it should be gone into the inventory and
assigned for that purpose. It wasn’t the purpose of [sic] the
difficulty of those issues that was the—you know, the
reason that I elevated it to my manager. It was more the
high-profile part of the case.127
The screening group manager felt that he should escalate these
cases in order to ensure consistency128 because the determinations
specialists did not have adequate guidance on how to handle
them.129
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
TIGTA Report, supra note 1, at 10.
NO EVIDENCE OF WHITE HOUSE INVOLVEMENT, supra note 32, at 11.
H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, PRELIMINARY
STATUS UPDATE ON COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION OF “INAPPROPRIATE CRITERIA”
USED BY IRS TO EVALUATE APPLICATIONS FOR TAX EXEMPT STATUS (Jun. 9,
2013) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY STATUS UPDATE] (quoting Interview with
Screening Group Manager, supra note 61, at 148).
128. In his interview with House Committee staff, the screening group
manager stated: “Now, is it prudent for us to then make sure, for consistency
purposes, that these cases are worked by the same folks or the same group? The
determination was yes, it is.” Interview with Screening Group Manager, supra
note 61, at 78.
129. The House Oversight Committee, in a report finding no evidence of
political bias in the Tea Party targeting scandal, quoted a D.C. tax law specialist,
saying, “[t]his is purely cases that, unfortunately, Cincinnati didn’t have enough
guidance on. That (c)(4) area is a very, very difficult area, and there’s not much
guidance.” NO EVIDENCE OF WHITE HOUSE INVOLVEMENT, supra note 32, at 3.

2014]

COMMENT

283

Former acting IRS Commissioner Steven Miller apologized for the
IRS’s actions shortly after the release of the TIGTA report on the
scandal,130 saying that “[p]artisanship or even the perception of
partisanship has no place at the IRS. . . . It cannot even appear to be a
consideration in determining the tax exemption of an organization.”131
He then stated that the targeting was the result of “foolish mistakes” by
individuals who were “trying to be more efficient in their workload
selection.”132 Miller resigned shortly after the release of the report, and
President Barack Obama appointed Daniel Werfel to replace him.133
A. Justification for Targeting by the IRS
TIGTA, in a report related to the Tea Party scandal finding that
the IRS centralization methods were improper, stated that:
The mission of the IRS is to provide America’s taxpayers
top quality service by helping them understand and meet
their tax responsibilities and by applying the tax law with
integrity and fairness to all. . . . IRS employees accomplish
this mission by being impartial and handling tax matters in
a manner that will promote public confidence.134
TIGTA’s use of the IRS’s own mission statement highlights
several important considerations when justifying the IRS’s actions:
consistent and fair application of the tax laws, impartiality, and
promotion of public confidence.135 It is through this lens that the
IRS must construe the Code.
“[The Supreme] Court has long recognized the primary
authority of the IRS and its predecessors in construing the Internal
Revenue Code,”136 and with that authority Congress has given the
IRS broad discretion to interpret the tax laws.137 The Court has
stated that such wide discretion is necessary because “[i]n an area
as complex as the tax system, the agency Congress vests with
administrative responsibility must be able to exercise its authority
to meet changing conditions and new problems.”138 Thus, although
130. Washington Alert—Part I, supra note 1.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. New IRS Report Shows Steps Taken to Fix Problems Relating to Recent
Tax-Exempt-Status Scandal, 59 FED. TAXES WEEKLY ALERT, June 27, 2013, art.
5 [hereinafter New IRS Report].
134. TIGTA Report, supra note 1, at 6.
135. See id.
136. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596 (1983).
137. See id.
138. Id.
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Congress is charged with creating the tax law, that law does not
address every conceivable situation, and it becomes the duty of the
IRS, as administrators of the Code, to decide what the Code means
and how to adapt it to changing circumstances.139
But is it reasonable to target related organizations when
uncertainty arises in the tax law? The IRS has limited resources
with which to carry out its duty to administer the entire Code.140
With such a task before the IRS, it is certainly reasonable to expect
that it would find ways to isolate similar applications and work
them together. In addition to the added efficiency such a system
affords, targeting allows the IRS to carry out its delegated duties to
the American citizenry while also holding true to its own mission
to “enforce the law with integrity and fairness to all.”141 Working
similar applications together ensures one coherent position in a
world where a lack of guidance on a new issue creates the risk of
inconsistent treatment by lower-level agents.
B. Propriety of Tea Party Targeting
Although the IRS is authorized to target similar organizations
when new issues arise, the more specific question remains whether
the IRS was authorized to target Tea Party organizations in the
way that it did, and if technically authorized, how the IRS should
alter its practices to avoid future scandal. Targeting of similar
applications was not a new process for the IRS, but the means by
which that targeting was achieved in the context of the Tea Party
differs from other examples in one important respect: credit
139. Id. In Bob Jones University v. United States, the Court stated:
Congress, the source of IRS authority, can modify IRS rulings it
considers improper; and courts exercise review over IRS actions. In the
first instance, however, the responsibility for construing the Code falls
to the IRS. Since Congress cannot be expected to anticipate every
conceivable problem that can arise or to carry out day-to-day oversight,
it relies on the administrators and on the courts to implement the
legislative will. Administrators, like judges, are under oath to do so.
Id. at 596–97.
140. Then acting IRS Commissioner Daniel Werfel, in remarks before the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, highlighted the IRS’s
difficulties in performing its functions with such limited resources, claiming:
It is vital for the IRS to receive adequate resources going forward in
order for us to deliver on our dual mission of enforcing the tax laws and
providing excellent customer service, and so it is fair to ask whether the
IRS can meet its objectives for sustained excellence in enforcement and
taxpayer service in the budget environment we are in.
Danny Werfel, Acting Commissioner, Internal Revenue Serv., Remarks Before
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (Nov. 6, 2013).
141. The Agency, supra note 14.
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counseling organizations and donor-advised funds do not appear to
be selected for review based on the organizations’ names.142
In the case of campaign intervention by social welfare
organizations, after examining the existing data filed by exempt
organizations, the Exempt Organizations unit “developed
indicators of potential noncompliance that allow[ed] [EO] to better
focus [its] resources.”143 The IRS developed the criteria for
selecting these organizations with the aim of filtering out similar
applications for review based on evidence of political campaign
intervention.144 Consequently, these indicators of noncompliance
eventually led to searches for organizations that mentioned certain
names,145 all of which suggested a significant conservative
political bias on the part of the IRS. After a screening group
manager centralized the first Tea Party case and sent it to EO
Technical, he then “instructed his Screening Agents to identify
additional cases that were similar based on their facts and
circumstances.”146 The targeting of Tea Party groups in this way
originated in part as a result of the gray area that exists between a
social welfare organization exempt through section 501(c)(4) and a
political organization exempt through section 527, as well as the
overall structure of the Tea Party.
1. The Section 501/527 Gray Area
Social welfare organizations engaging in campaign intervention
operate within a gray area between section 501(c)(4) and another type
of organization: section 527 political organizations.147 Section 527
political organizations are those organized “to receive contributions or
to expend funds for exempt activities including the selection,
nomination, election, or appointment of candidates for public or party
office.”148 Like social welfare organizations, section 527 organizations
“are tax exempt, and contributions to the organizations are not
deductible by donors.”149 The major difference between the two
organizations developed in 2000 when Congress added provisions

142. See supra Part I.B.
143. FY 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 23.
144. NO EVIDENCE OF WHITE HOUSE INVOLVEMENT, supra note 32, at 28.
145. TIGTA Report, supra note 1, at 6. The terms included “Tea Party,”
“Patriots,” and “9/12 Project.”
146. PRELIMINARY STATUS UPDATE, supra note 127.
147. See I.R.C. § 527 (2012).
148. Taxation of Political Organizations, U.S. TAX REP. (RIA) ¶ 5274
(2013).
149. Tobin, supra note 5, at 1122.
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requiring disclosure by section 527 organizations of donors and
expenditures:
Independent advocacy organizations that wanted to avoid
the disclosure provisions in section 527 then sought to
organize under other code provisions, principally as social
welfare organizations or business leagues. The main hurdle
for political groups was that to qualify for exempt status as
a social welfare organization or a business league, their
primary purpose needed to be consistent with their exempt
purpose. It is this attempt to circumvent congressional
intent regarding political organizations’ disclosure of
contributions and expenditures that created most of the
current regulatory mess.150
Because of this disclosure requirement, many groups “have
strong incentives to organize as tax-exempt entities that are not
subject to the disclosure provisions, most notably social welfare
organizations and business leagues.”151
Far from being a binary determination—placing an organization
completely within either section 501(c)(4) or section 527 for purposes
of taxation—the Code allows social welfare organizations to engage in
some political campaign intervention while remaining within section
501(c)(4), and the organization is “taxed to the extent it actually
operates as a political organization”152 under section 527(f).153 This
gray area gives the IRS an interest in the discovery of any political
campaign activity whatsoever by social welfare organizations, not
just at times when it can comfortably be said that political activity
has become the organization’s primary purpose.
Regardless of the amount of political activity, the IRS is
required to investigate to ensure an organization is paying
necessary taxes,154 as well as complying with disclosure
requirements if the organization is actually a section 527 political
organization.155 In addition, given the political nature of the goals
150. Id. at 1123.
151. Id. at 1120.
152. Taxation of Political Organizations, supra note 148.
153. I.R.C. § 527(f)(1) (2012). This provision of the Code imposes a tax on
political campaign activity by section 501 organizations, requiring the
organization to report as taxable income the lesser of its net investment income
for the year or its political campaign spending. Id. The ease of avoiding a tax on
political campaign activity by simply keeping investment income low, although
interesting, is an issue that lies outside of the scope of this Comment.
154. Id. § 527(f).
155. Political campaign organizations must provide notice to the IRS before
their exemptions will be recognized, id. § 527(i), and must disclose certain
expenditures and contributions. Id. § 527(j).
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of Tea Party organizations,156 any method of filtering out
organizations engaged in political spending is likely to result in the
investigation of many Tea Party groups. Because the IRS was
authorized to look at these types of fact situations together, such
centralization was not necessarily improper. The Tea Party
applications just happened to be included among the influx of
applications that screening agents did not have enough guidance on
how to process.157 Any impropriety on the part of the IRS did not
arise from the fact that Tea Party applications were centralized, but
instead from within the criteria used to isolate such applications.
2. The Structure of the Tea Party
The IRS understood that filtering the cases based on searches
for certain terms was not the sole basis for centralizing applications
for full development. According to a manager for EO Technical,
using the “Tea Party” term “was really just an efficient way to
refer to this issue,” and the IRS agents “all understood that the real
issue was campaign intervention.”158 The manager’s understanding
was that cases were still being reviewed without consideration of
the organizations’ political leanings, despite use of these search
term criteria.159
156. The Tea Party website outlines the purposes for which the Tea Party
initially formed:
The Tea Party includes those who possess a strong belief in the
foundational Judeo-Christian values embedded in our great founding
documents. We believe the responsibility of our beloved nation
is etched upon the hearts of true American Patriots from every race,
religion, national origin, and walk of life sharing a common belief in
the values which made and keep our beloved nation great. This belief
led to the creation of the modern-day Tea Party.
About Us – Tea Party, TEAPARTY, http://www.teaparty.org/about-us/, archived
at http://perma.cc/W7NX-YR93 (last visited June 30, 2014).
157. In an interview on the centralization of Tea Party organizations, an IRS
tax law specialist denied that Tea Party groups were specifically targeted,
saying:
Cincinnati had [] a giant influx at a certain period of time of
applications that were applying for (c)(4) mostly, some for (c)(3)s, and
that had what they thought was kind of a political campaign advocacy
component, and didn’t really know how to move forward or if there
was a problem, because there were so many at the same time, and with
the little guidance out there, what to exactly do, because of the
concerns raised by political campaign intervention activities that might
occur.
NO EVIDENCE OF WHITE HOUSE INVOLVEMENT, supra note 32, at 28.
158. Id. at 37.
159. Id.
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The shorthand use of “Tea Party” to target a group of similar
applications arose when a screening group member escalated the
first Tea Party application to EO Technical and instructed
screening agents to search for additional similar cases.160 One of
these agents described the process that led to the development of
the search terms:
When I looked at the initial Tea Parties that were in house, the
applications when they come in, I would see that they had
Web sites. So I would look at the Web sites. Then I would see
other names . . . . I noticed that there were hundreds of these
things. . . . maybe thousands. And I saw some other names. So
some of those names I used, some of those terms, to find the
Tea Parties. . . . I had to watch my queries and zero in on what
I wanted.161
Anyone with experience in research can relate to this situation.
One begins a search, often not expecting to find what he is looking
for immediately. Instead, that initial search reveals other, more
specific search terms, which the researcher then incorporates into
subsequent searches to ultimately discover useful sources. Here,
the screening agent was handed a Tea Party application and
instructed to find similar ones. The Tea Party search term was the
agent’s way of separating a group of applications with signs of
political activity from the rest of the applications as efficiently as
possible.162
It is entirely logical that visiting the website for one of these
organizations could lead to a belief that any similarly named
organization’s application would also require centralization. The
website for the Tea Party Patriots, for example, states that the
movement has grown to thousands of groups since its founding in
2009.163 It openly welcomes new members, and in describing why
people join the Tea Party, the website asks, “Would you like to
have more influence in realigning our Federal, State and Local
Government with the US Constitution?”164 The Patriots then go on
to describe a vast network of local, state, and national coordinators
160. Id.
161. PRELIMINARY STATUS UPDATE, supra note 127, at 10.
162. Id. The Screening Agent mentions in his interview that at one point he
attempted to search for just the term “tea,” but that did not help much, as it also
returned results containing the term “teacher,” a category of applications quite
separate from the Tea Party applications. Id.
163. Getting Started, TEA PARTY PATRIOTS, http://www.teapartypatriots.org
/get-started/, archived at http://perma.cc/6MWW-4RHJ (last visited Oct. 18,
2013).
164. Id.
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and explain that even though each group is independent, all share
the organization’s core values.165 Not only do the Tea Party
Patriots tout their connections with a wide network of other
organizations, but they also state that such organizations seek
influence in realigning government with the Constitution.166 For a
screening group agent tasked with searching for campaign
intervention, this type of description makes the decision to search
for other Tea Party applications seem like an obvious one.
III. CURATIVE APPROACHES TO THE POLITICAL SPENDING PROBLEM
On May 13, 2013, President Barack Obama—in response to
Lois Lerner’s speech to the American Bar Association and the
resulting accusations of political bias—said, “If you've got the IRS
operating in anything less than a neutral and nonpartisan way, then
that is outrageous, it is contrary to our traditions. And people have
to be held accountable, and it’s got to be fixed.”167 However, a
report of findings by the Democratic staff in the House Oversight
and Government Reform Committee concluded that there was no
evidence of political bias in the targeting of these organizations
and that the centralization was no more than an attempt to ensure
that these applications were being processed in the same way.168
Meanwhile, there was movement in the administration of the
IRS as Acting Commissioner Steven Miller stepped down in
response to the scandal and was replaced by Daniel Werfel.169 One
of Werfel’s first assignments as the new Acting Commissioner was
to compile a report detailing the actions of the IRS as they related
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. More Details Emerge on IRS’s Targeting, supra note 4.
168. NO EVIDENCE OF WHITE HOUSE INVOLVEMENT, supra note 32, at 13. In
giving its findings, the Committee reported:
Despite an extremely aggressive investigation involving more than a
half million pages of documents and 39 interviews of IRS and Treasury
employees, the overwhelming evidence before the Committee reveals
no political motivation or White House involvement in the screening of
tax-exempt applications. . . . The e-mail traffic indicated there were
unclear processing directions and the group wanted to make sure they
had guidance on processing the applications so they pulled them.
Id. Lily Kahng argues that “[t]he evidence thus far indicates that the IRS may
have been tone-deaf and feckless but was not motivated by a political agenda.”
Kahng, supra note 2, at 44.
169. Zachary A. Goldfarb & Aaron Blake, Daniel Werfel Replaces Miller as
Acting IRS Commissioner, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com
/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/05/16/daniel-werfel-to-replace-miller-as-acting-irscommissioner/, archived at http://perma.cc/X7X3-7MXA (last visited June 3,
2014).
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to the scandal.170 This report includes Werfel’s initial findings and
sets out a plan for handling the existing backlog of applications
selected for review and avoiding future scandal.171 Although
Werfel largely agreed with TIGTA’s findings that inappropriate
criteria were used,172 he was careful to point out that full
investigation of the targeting and the implementation of a longterm solution would take time.173
A. The IRS’s Stopgap Solution
Werfel’s report highlighted that the IRS’s immediate priority
was to handle the significant backlog of applications that had been
waiting as long as three years for a determination.174 On June 25,
2013, the EO unit released a memorandum providing interim
guidance for certain applications still awaiting determination.175
The memorandum established a special process for the expedited
handling of applications that had been pending for more than 120
days as of May 28, 2013, where there were indicators that the
organization may be involved in political campaign intervention.176
Under this new approach, qualifying applications were
reviewed immediately for private inurement,177 and if that review
170. New IRS Report, supra note 133.
171. WERFEL, supra note 29.
172. See generally id.
173. Id. at 7 (“[A]lthough there is a desire for immediate answers regarding
the circumstances that led to the inappropriate treatment of taxpayers identified
in the TIGTA Report, such expediency must be carefully balanced with the need
to engage in thorough and fair fact-finding.”).
174. Id. at 22 (“Appropriately resolving the cases that have been in the queue
for action and resolution for unacceptable periods of time is a top priority for the
IRS.”). Werfel then stated that 132 applications had been previously categorized
as “potential political cases” and were pending for more than 120 days as of
May 28, 2013, making them eligible for interim expedited processing. Id. The
TIGTA report, on the other hand, identified 160 potential political cases that had
been pending for more than 120 days (with all of the applications experiencing a
delay of at least 181 days, and 129 having been in development for more than a
year), with the average delay being 574 days, which is longer than the average
delay for other categories of full-development applications. TIGTA Report,
supra note 1, at 15.
175. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERIM
GUIDANCE ON OPTIONAL EXPEDITED PROCESS FOR CERTAIN EXEMPTION
APPLICATIONS UNDER SECTION 501(C)(4) (June 25, 2013) [hereinafter INTERIM
GUIDANCE], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/foia/ig/spder/TEGE_07_0613_0
8.pdf, archived at http://perma .cc/6PQM-EEPY.
176. Id.
177. Id. Code section 501(c)(4) does not grant exemption “unless no part of
the net earnings of such entity inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual.” I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(B) (2012). Although this “private inurement”
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found no such inurement, the organization could elect to
participate in the “expedited option.”178 This process allows an
organization to receive a favorable determination by self-certifying
to the IRS that during the current, previous, and all future tax
years, the organization has devoted, does devote, and will devote at
least 60% of both its expenditures and total time to its social
welfare purposes and “less than 40% of both the organization’s
total expenditures and its total time . . . on direct or indirect
participation or intervention in any political campaign on behalf of
(or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.”179
Organizations that qualify but choose not to self-certify that their
political activity is below a certain level—presumably because
their figures rise above the threshold level but still feel that they
are entitled to exemption—are still able to pursue the traditional
facts-and-circumstances test.180
This expedited processing, however, is not permanent and only
applies to a limited group of applications.181 Specifically, in order
for an application to be eligible for expedited review, it must meet
two requirements: (1) the application must have been identified
previously by the IRS as a potential political case; and (2) the
application must have been pending for at least 120 days as of May
28, 2013.182 Essentially, the date and delay requirements isolate
applications that were the focus of the TIGTA Report.183 Thus, the

requirement is an important element of exemption for social welfare
organizations, discussion of its nuances lies outside of the scope of this
Comment.
178. “By letter to the applicant, Exempt Organizations Determinations will
provide an optional expedited process for all pending applications for which
there are no indications of private inurement.” INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note
175.
179. WERFEL, supra note 29, at 24. Werfel expected that organizations
choosing this self-certification option would receive a determination within two
weeks of self-certification. Id. He was careful, however, not to guarantee this
response time, warning that “due to the fact that some of these determinations
represent difficult and complex judgments, some [applications] may still take
longer to resolve than others.” Id. at 23.
180. Id. at 25. “Organizations that wish to be evaluated under all the facts
and circumstances rather than to conduct their own measurements retain that
option via Path 1,” which represents the traditional determinations process. Id.
181. Although there is no specific end date to the interim process, it only
applies to applications pending before a certain date, necessarily limiting the
group of applications subject to the interim guidance to a discrete group. Id. at
22.
182. Id.
183. Werfel, when describing the expedited process in his report on the
scandal, stated:
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IRS’s solution is merely a stopgap and not meant to apply beyond
the scandal.184
Offering two options to organizations applying for recognition
of their tax-exempt status—self-certification or a facts-andcircumstances review—can jeopardize the goals of consistency
that motivate the IRS to target related organizations in the first
place. It runs counter to the IRS’s goal of consistency to allow
pending applications to be split into two separate groups: one of
which is determined by organizations themselves, and the other is
reviewed by the agency’s trained tax specialists who can better call
upon the resources within the IRS for guidance.
New issues require new standards, and any attempt at creating
a bright-line rule that can adequately address all exempt
applications appears to do little to reduce the necessity of
centralization. As long as cases are centralized when a new issue
arises, there exists the potential for allegations of IRS political
bias. As a result, the expedited-processing safe harbor—though
useful when looking at the cases that are the subject of this
particular scandal—cannot be easily adapted for general
applicability without being vulnerable to the same risks that the
current regime also faces. By that same logic, proposed section
501(c)(4) regulations issued in November 2013—requesting
comments on the amount of campaign intervention that should be
allowed—will do little to solve future nonpolitical interpretation
issues. Additionally, “[i]f the final regulations do not apply similar
requirements to all section 501(c) organizations other than
charities, groups will simply reorganize under another code
provision.”185 These ad hoc remedial measures can be effective
within specific application categories, but they do little to address
fresh problems as they arise.

[W]e have defined the “priority backlog” for our initial focus to be
501(c)(4) applications that have been previously identified as “potential
political cases”—i.e., the focus of the TIGTA audit—and that were
submitted to the IRS for initial review more than 120 days prior to May
28, 2013 (the first week of new leadership at the IRS).

Id.
184. Werfel points out that the applications at issue in the TIGTA Report are
the subject of the IRS’s “initial focus” and that this expedited processing “is not
available to other applicants at this time.” Id.
185. Tobin, supra note 5, at 1128. Tobin continues by pointing out that
“[g]roups are already contemplating using section 501(c)(6) business leagues
and section 501(c)(19) veterans organizations as a way to engage in campaignrelated activity, and section 501(c) contains many opportunities for
organizations that could be used as an end run around the regulation.” Id.
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B. Avoiding Inappropriate Criteria
The IRS is charged with administering the Tax Code, and in
doing so it is authorized to look at related organizations together
when those organizations operate in an uncertain area of the law.186
Tea Party organizations were among those in this category,
engaging in political activity that—even if ultimately not
threatening exemption—warranted closer inspection by the IRS.
Agents tasked with finding these related applications developed
search terms that would reliably and efficiently locate those
needing full development.187 At every step of the process, the IRS
was acting within its authority, in pursuit of its mission to “enforce
the law with integrity and fairness to all.”188 In this case, the IRS
needed to subject a group of applications to a lengthier
determinations process in order to ensure the fairness it promises.
Although there is justification for the IRS’s targeting of Tea
Party and similar organizations, many have agreed that the
methods used for such targeting were not ideal.189 Despite an
absence of evidence of political bias,190 the IRS would benefit
from taking steps to ensure that future targeting does not raise
concerns that the IRS is acting with a partisan motive.191 However,
the problem then becomes how the IRS should structure its
procedures so as to effectively filter applications that must be fully
developed without inviting criticism that such an investigation is
motivated by political bias.

186. See supra Part III.
187. See supra Part II.B.2.
188. The Agency, supra note 14.
189. See, e.g., TIGTA Report, supra note 1, at 5 (finding that targeting
organizations based on certain terms in the exemption application was
“inappropriate”); WERFEL, supra note 29, at 6 (“Significant management and
judgment failures occurred . . . that contributed to the inappropriate treatment of
certain taxpayers applying for tax exempt status.”); More Details Emerge on IRS’s
Targeting, supra note 4. Former IRS Commissioner Steven Miller “stated that
centralizing cases ‘made sense,’ but agreed that the way in which they were
centralized was improper.” More Details Emerge on IRS’s Targeting, supra note
4.
190. NO EVIDENCE OF WHITE HOUSE INVOLVEMENT, supra note 32, at 3.
191. Werfel’s report stated: “A critical component of our action plan is to
implement necessary controls to permanently address the problems with the tax
exempt application process, as identified in the TIGTA report.” WERFEL, supra
note 29, at 14.
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C. An Argument for IRS Targeting Through the Audit Process
“Whether this scandal will ultimately bring about clearer
guidance or new legislation in the Code Sec. 501(c)(4) arena,
derail IRS efforts to police the political activities of Code Sec.
501(c)(4) groups, or distract Congress from its larger goals of tax
reform remains to be seen.”192 Although Congress may act to bring
more certainty to the permissible level of political intervention by
section 501(c)(4) organizations, passing legislation can be a
lengthy process.193 Additionally, any legislation enacted to address
the campaign intervention problem is not likely to have broad
enough applicability to address future tax problems as they arise;
after all, the passing of the Pension Protection Act, although it did
have a significant effect on donor-advised funds,194 did not aid the
IRS in handling future tax issues. Therefore, the IRS should use
the wide discretion given to it by Congress to take its own steps to
reduce the risk of further “inappropriate” criteria.195
Specifically, the IRS should consider adopting an open-door
determinations process for recognition of exemption.196 This opendoor process would allow organizations to self-certify that they
operate according to the tax law and recognize exemption in the
absence of obvious application deficiencies—similar to the
expedited determination process that the IRS is currently using for
the initial backlog of applications.197 As a second prong of this
approach, in order to address the problems created by such a selfcertification system, the IRS should continue to engage in targeted
centralization of applications through the examination (audit)
process rather than the determinations process. By doing so, the
IRS would be better able to develop proper selection criteria, thus
maintaining consistency and efficiency in the processing of
192. More Details Emerge on IRS’s Targeting, supra note 4.
193. See, e.g., Molly Ball, It’s Been 951 Days Since the Senate Passed a
Major New Law, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 20, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.the
atlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/02/its-been-951-days-since-the-senate-passed
-a-major-new-law/273197/, archived at http://perma.cc/GK9J-4V95.
194. See supra Part I.B.2.
195. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596 (1983).
196. The use of the word “recognition” here is deliberate. While many
organizations do not have to apply for an exemption itself, but instead apply for
recognition of the exemption granted to them by law, section 501(c)(3)
organizations must apply for and be granted exemption. This Comment’s
proposed solution would not apply in the latter case, but only to applications that
are little more than a request for the IRS to acknowledge that the organization is
exempt.
197. See supra Part III.A.
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applications whenever new issues arise while also minimizing the
risk of future cries of partisanship and unfairness by the public.
1. Open-Door Determinations and Targeting Through Auditing
As opposed to the determinations process, whereby every
application is reviewed to some extent, the examinations process is
more limited.198 To illustrate with the individual income tax return
process, the audit as it is known today used to be performed on
every single return.199 However, as the number of overall returns
increased after the revival of the income tax in 1913, the ability of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue—the IRS’s predecessor—to give
individual attention to each return decreased.200 By 1918, “the
problem confronting the Bureau . . . was to devise an
administrative system by which an accumulation of approximately
4,000,000 income returns of individuals and corporations could be
audited and any additional tax due could be discovered, assessed,
and collected in the briefest possible time.”201 The Bureau stopped
attempting to individually audit each return, and from that arose
the current system of self-assessment, requiring taxpayers to
account for their tax liability on their own, subject to audit.202
Thus, the need for a selective audit system arose from a rapid
increase in workload for an agency with limited resources.203 As
with individual tax returns, tax-exempt organization applications
often experience rapid increases in activity, making it impossible
for the IRS to fully examine each application to determine initial
tax consequences.204 By allowing organizations to secure
exemption by self-certifying that they are eligible, those
organizations will not be forced to wait until the IRS is able to

198. In 2011, 1.3% of returns filed by tax-exempt organizations were selected
for audit. Do Nonprofits Really Need to Worry About IRS Audits?, NOLO, http:
//www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/do-nonprofits-really-need-worry-about-irs-au
dits.html, archived at http://perma.cc/EE4T-KS2L (last updated May 2013).
199. Bryan T. Camp, Theory and Practice in Tax Administration, 29 VA.
TAX REV. 227, 234 (2009).
200. Id. at 237.
201. U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, THE WORK AND JURISDICTION OF THE BUREAU
OF INTERNAL REVENUE 97 (1948).
202. Camp, supra note 199, at 239.
203. Regarding the benefits of a self-assessment tax collection system,
Andrew Okello argued that “[t]he most cost effective systems of collecting taxes
are those that induce the vast majority of taxpayers to meet their tax obligations
voluntarily.” Andrew Okello, Managing Income Tax Compliance Through SelfAssessment 4 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/14/41, 2014).
204. See supra Part I.
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fully evaluate their application before reaping the benefits of the
tax exemption to which organizations believe they are entitled.
If the IRS leaves initial determinations to the organizations
themselves, the targeting of applications at the audit stage would
invite less criticism. By opting to stay silent at the determination
stage, the IRS’s decision to audit would be its first analysis of an
organization’s activities. In contrast, the determinations process
today requires an IRS decision at the initial stages of an
organization’s exemption, leaving the IRS to reverse its own
previous decision when it discovers that a misunderstanding of the
law or new legal issue has resulted in the incorrect recognition of
exemption. Instead, by moving the entire inquiry to the audit
process, a decision to revoke exemption would not be inconsistent
with previous IRS determinations, and the goals of consistency and
efficiency would remain intact. Doing so would give the IRS
much-needed time to develop calculated methods for singling out
particular organizations before targeting takes place and would not
require organizations to wait for that to happen before their
exemption is recognized. Many section 501(c)(4) organizations
already operate without seeking IRS recognition first, meaning the
system is already largely self-certifying. By making the process
completely self-certifying, the IRS can remove itself entirely from
that initial determination and instead focus its time and resources
on audit selection.205
The audit process brings with it an expectation of heightened
scrutiny. Most are familiar with audits: a time when the IRS digs
deeper into a taxpayer’s activities to ensure that the taxpayer is
acting within the requirements of the Code.206 The IRS website
itself explains that “[a]n IRS audit is a review/examination of an
organization’s or individual’s accounts and financial information
205. Tax administration under a self-assessment system simply shifts IRS
scrutiny from pre-filing to post-filing. Okello, supra note 203, at 11. Okello
further explains:
The tax administration relies more on post-filing controls such as riskbased audits, collection enforcement measures, and prosecution of tax
evaders. Tax administrations operating self-assessment systems adopt
targeted verification approaches (e.g., through information sharing, data
matching, and risk-based desk and field audits) to verify the information
contained in tax returns.
Id.
206. Granted, popular media does not exactly look fondly on the added
scrutiny involved in an audit. For a good example, Season 2, Episode 22, of the
popular sitcom “Roseanne” focuses on the main characters as they prepare their
annual income tax returns. Every time the word “audit” is mentioned, it is
followed by scary music, as if to liken the audit to a horror film. Roseanne:
April Fool’s Day (ABC television broadcast Apr. 10, 1990).
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to ensure information is being reported correctly, according to the
tax laws, to verify the amount of tax reported is accurate.”207 The
website continues by explaining that this examination involves a
request for additional documentation and suggests that such an
examination can potentially involve some delay.208 By reserving
the targeting of potentially political social welfare organizations
for the audit process, the IRS could cut down on complaints about
the level of scrutiny and delay involved in examining organizations
at the determination stage. There would still be heightened scrutiny
and lengthy delays in some cases, but within the context of the
audit, those side effects are expected instead of looked upon as a
sign that something is going wrong.
2. Organizational Compliance
A concern inherent in a system of self-certification is that
organizations will “cheat the system” by certifying that their
political activity is within a permissible level when it actually is
not, choosing to gamble on the chance that their activity will be
overlooked by the audit process. This concern is understandable:
the IRS audit rate for tax-exempt organizations currently hovers
around a mere 1.3%.209 With audit rates so low, and an even lower
chance that an audit will result in a revocation of exemption,210 one
would certainly expect that organizations might be willing to just
take the risk in exchange for the benefits of noncompliance.
Despite what may be expected, self-certification at the initial
application level is unlikely to bring forth a flood of compliance
problems. First, oversight by other agencies and the public in
general—coupled with the potential that one of those outside
parties could even convince the IRS to audit an organization—
207. IRS Audits, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/Businesses
/Small-Businesses-%26-Self-Employed/IRS-Audits, archived at http://perma.cc
/6RPF-HF9Q (last updated June 20, 2014).
208. Id.
209. Do Nonprofits Really Need to Worry About IRS Audits?, supra note 198.
Stephen Fishman, in his article on the Tea Party scandal, stated that “the real
scandal is that hardly any nonprofits of any type ever get audited by the IRS,”
id., and supported his argument with statistics of IRS audit rates:
In 2012, for example, [the IRS] examined only 10,743 of the 798,903
returns filed by tax-exempt organizations in 2011. Thus, only about
1.3% of all nonprofits filing returns were audited. In 2011, the odds of
being audited were about the same: 11,699 of 858,865 returns filed in
2010 were audited, for an audit percentage of 1.3%.
Id.
210. Id. Fishman speculated that “[t]here’s probably a better chance that a
nonprofit’s office will be hit by a meteor than lose its tax exemption.” Id.
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could dissuade organizations from opting to take a questionable tax
position.211 Second, a system of strategic publicity of IRS
enforcement successes would create the perception that the IRS is
well-equipped to fully enforce the Code and that the risk of audit is
higher than IRS resources allow.212 With these additional tools—
oversight by outsiders and strategic publicity—the IRS could
effectively reduce, if not cancel, any increase in noncompliance that
would otherwise occur in a completely open and unregulated
determinations process. When coupled with the benefits of targeting
through auditing, the IRS becomes better suited to engage in
efficient administration of the Code while also gaining the time
necessary to develop criteria for targeting that do not run the risk of
drawing suspicion of unfairness.
a. Promoting Compliance Through Third Parties
The IRS has shown that it is willing to consider well-founded
arguments from outside parties that a particular individual should be
audited.213 The IRS “allows returns to be selected through . . .
referrals from other federal and state government agencies if these
returns can be shown to have a greater audit potential than a DIFselected return.”214 This third-party access to the audit process is
particularly useful in the tax-exempt context. Tax-exempt
organizations, by reason of their existence as organizations, are
subject to greater scrutiny by the public, other agencies, and
watchdog groups than the scrutiny to which an individual taxpayer
is normally subjected. For example, political organizations are
subject to certain disclosure requirements by the Federal Election
Commission,215 and private citizens are often willing to criticize

211. See infra Part III.C.2.a.
212. See infra Part III.C.2.b.
213. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-99-30, TAX
ADMINISTRATION: IRS’ RETURN SELECTION PROCESS 4 (1999) (including among
the categories of returns selected for audit “referrals of potentially noncompliant
returns that come from both inside and outside IRS”).
214. Id. at 1. “DIF” refers to the IRS Discriminant Function: “an automated
system for scoring individual tax returns according to their audit potential.” Id.
DIF scores are calculated using mathematical formulas created through intensive
examination of returns and designed to search for reliable indicators of tax
noncompliance. Selection of Returns for Audit, FED. INC. TAX’N OF INDIV. §
47.01 (current through 2013). Since the DIF is a mathematical process, and the
problems at issue with centralization would be difficult—if not impossible—to
reduce to mathematical formulas, discussion of the DIF as a solution is outside
the scope of this Comment.
215. Tobin, supra note 5, at 1125.
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organizations that appear to be abusing their exemptions.216 On the
part of the organizations, this public scrutiny serves two purposes
with respect to compliance. First, an organization’s mere presence
under the public eye might encourage it to decide against a
questionable tax position for fear of being caught. The second
purpose bolsters the first: an organization would be even more
likely to avoid the temptation to “test the waters” of the tax law if
it knows that those outside parties could also convince the IRS to
examine the organization a little more closely.
In a classroom, a teacher might ask a student to “watch the
class” for a few minutes while the teacher steps out; whereas
normally students would immediately misbehave once the teacher
leaves the room, they instead think twice about breaking the rules
because they know someone is watching them who will report their
actions to the teacher upon the teacher’s return. Similarly, by
allowing outside parties to “watch the class,” the IRS can promote
organizational compliance and honest self-certifications. In fact,
these outside influences have already played a part in the targeting
of political section 501(c)(4) organizations: as watchdog groups
contacted the IRS with reports of impermissible levels of political
activity, the IRS used that information to further refine its
indicators of noncompliance to better filter out organizations
needing extra examination.217
b. Strategic Publicity
In addition to outside influence from watchdog groups and other
agencies, a system of strategic publicity of audit successes would
promote compliance in the application process. Self-certification for
organizations is similar to the self-assessment system present in the
individual-income-tax world, of which President John F. Kennedy
said: “For voluntary self-assessment to be both meaningful and
productive of revenues, the citizens must not only have confidence in
the fairness of the tax laws, but also in [the] uniform and vigorous
enforcement of these laws.”218 Strategic publicity would encourage
216. For example, many have taken issue with the National Football League’s
status as a tax-exempt “professional football league” under section 501(c)(6). See
Brian Frederick, Why Does the National Football League Deserve Tax-Exempt
Status?, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 8, 2012, 2:38 PM), http://www.huff
ingtonpost.com/brian-frederick/nfl-tax-exempt_b_1321635.html, archived at http:
//perma.cc/YYS2-YZ7M.
217. FY 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 23.
218. John F. Kennedy, Special Message to Congress on Taxation (Apr. 20,
1961) (transcript available at http://millercenter.org/president/kennedy/speeches
/speech-5669, archived at http://perma.cc/7VC4-JYH8).
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that necessary confidence in vigorous enforcement, despite the lack of
sufficient resources to actually enforce every single tax misstep.219
The phrase “strategic publicity” refers to a system by which the
IRS publicizes specific examples of its successes as a means to
promote overall compliance in the absence of sufficient resources to
broaden enforcement efforts.220 “[B]ehavioral research suggests that
specific examples of tax enforcement are likely to influence
individuals’ perceptions of certain elements of the tax system, which,
in turn, may affect their decisions to comply with the tax law.”221 By
disclosing examples of the IRS’s successful enforcement of the Code’s
requirements, organizations would perceive a higher risk of being
caught if they decide to apply for an unwarranted exemption—even if
that risk is no higher than it is now—and a risk-averse organization
might make the decision to err on the side of safety.222
If the IRS projects itself as well-equipped to effectively enforce
abuses when a new issue arises, other organizations—even ones that
derive their exemption from a different Code section—might be
hesitant to take advantage of future tax uncertainties before receiving
guidance from the IRS, regardless of what that uncertainty might be.
Thus, the strategic publicity of political organization audit successes,
in addition to promoting compliance among other political
organizations, could also dissuade other organizations from attempting
to gain undue benefit from perceived tax uncertainties. By engaging in
this policy of strategic publicity, coupled with targeted audits
motivated in part by third-party oversight,223 the IRS can effectively
reduce the risk of noncompliance in an open-door determinations
system.

219. Arguing that “voluntary compliance is best achieved through a system
of self-assessment,” Andrew Okello states that taxpayers are more likely to
comply when the tax administration “creates strong deterrents to noncompliance through effective audit programs and consistent use of penalties,”
and “is transparent and seen by the public to be honest, fair, and even-handed in
its administration of the tax laws.” Okello, supra note 203, at 4. A selectivepublicity approach would allow the IRS to better manufacture this public
perception in the absence of sufficient resources to consistently audit all
instances of noncompliance.
220. See generally Joshua D. Blank, In Defense of Individual Tax Privacy, 61
EMORY L.J. 265 (2011).
221. Id. at 289.
222. Id. at 298 (“After encountering salient examples of specific taxpayers
whom the government has detected, individual taxpayers who might otherwise
be inclined to claim a questionable tax position may overestimate the IRS’s
capacity to detect abuse.”).
223. See supra Part III.C.2.a.
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CONCLUSION
In an environment where operating budgets shrink as workloads
increase at an alarming rate, it is necessary for the IRS to develop
ways to better administer and enforce the Tax Code so as to maximize
the benefit of its limited resources. To ensure fair and consistent
application of the tax law while avoiding the risk of future allegations
of impropriety, the IRS should open up the determinations process to
self-certification by organizations and move the targeting process to
the audit function of the IRS. By engaging in audit-level targeting of
similar organizations, the IRS would procure more time to create a
coherent approach as new issues or perceived abuses arise.
Additionally, the audit process is widely understood to involve
heightened scrutiny and delay, which were both problems complained
of by Tea Party organizations; however, that complaint would lose
some of its force if the organization were able to have its exemption
recognized through self-certification in the meantime. By using the
audit process to evaluate whether an organization qualifies for
exemption, instead of attempting such an evaluation at both the
determinations and examinations level, the IRS can continue to benefit
from centralization while reducing the impression that it is acting with
bias, whether that bias be political or otherwise.
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